Abstract-Perfect failure detectors can correctly decide whether a computer is crashed. However, it is impossible to implement a perfect failure detector in purely asynchronous systems. We show how to enforce perfect failure detection in timed asynchronous systems with hardware watchdogs. The two main system model assumptions are (1) each computer can measure time intervals with a known maximum error, and (2) each computer has a watchdog that crashes the computer unless the watchdog is periodically updated. We have implemented a system that satisfies both assumptions using a combination of off-the-shelf software and hardware. To implement a perfect failure detector for process crash failures, we show that in some systems a hardware watchdog is actually not necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
A perfect failure detector [5] can correctly decide whether a computer is crashed. Perfect failure detectors can be very useful in the design of fault-tolerant distributed systems. For example, a backup system can use a perfect failure detector to detect crash failures of the primary system. In case the backup detects a crash failure, it can take over without risking that the primary is still alive -which could lead to undesirable inconsistencies.
Most existing failure detectors are heartbeat based and do not prevent wrong suspicions. A wrong suspicion might lead to situations in which two computers think that they are the primary computer. Some membership based systems like ISIS [2] detect wrong suspicions and they remove wrongly suspected processes from the membership. However, these processes might learn of the removal after they are suspected. We will explain why this is not sufficient for some systems, e.g., systems that access external devices like shared disks.
In this paper we propose a novel protocol that makes sure that computers are crashed before they are suspected. The difficulty in achieving this is that if a computer is suspected, it is crashed or partitioned away from the other computers, e.g., due to a network failure. In the latter case, communication with the computer is lost and hence, initiating a remote crash is not possible. More formally, we will explain why this problem is not solvable in purely asynchronous systems like those described by the FLP model [12] .
Our failure detector protocol is a two level protocol. The lower-level level implements an unreliable failure detector that is supposed to minimize wrong suspicions, i.e., it should only rarely suspect non-crashed computers. However, one cannot completely prevent that wrong suspicions happen on this level. The higher-level mechanism makes sure that before any suspicion is propagated to the clients of the failure detector, the suspected computer is guaranteed to have failed using leases and the watchdog of the suspected computer.
Originally, perfect failure detection was defined for detecting process crash failures in systems in which processes cannot recover from a crash. In this paper we are interested in detecting computer crash failures in systems in which computers can recover from a crash failure. We are also interested in detecting crash failures within a bounded time. To cope with these constraints, we define a new failure detector class ¢ ¡ (where stands for timed and ¡ for perfect). A failure detector class is the set of all failure detectors that satisfy a given set of properties. We call a failure detector in £ ¡ timed-perfect. Each timed-perfect failure detector correctly decides if a computer ¤ is crashed or not -even if somebody permanently or transiently disconnects the network of ¤ . Formally, we show in this paper that each timed-perfect failure detector satisfies the conditions of a perfect failure detector in systems without recovery.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. We sketch in Section II how one can implement a perfect failure detector in a synchronous system before we explain why one cannot implement a perfect failure detector in purely asynchronous systems. In Section III we describe three sample application domains of perfect failure detectors to support that they are useful in the design of fault-tolerant distributed systems. We define in Section IV timed-perfect failure detectors and show in Section V that timed-perfect failure detectors are indeed perfect in systems without recoveries. We introduce the timed asynchronous system model in Section VI before we describe the implementation of a timed-perfect failure detector in Section VII. We describe performance measurements of our protocol in Section VIII and explain why one does not necessarily need a hardware watchdog for a perfect process failure detector in Section IX. Before we conclude the paper, we review related work in Section X. 
II. POSSIBILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
In this section we first explain how one can implement a perfect failure detector in a completely synchronous system before we show why it cannot be implemented in a purely asynchronous system.
A. Completely Synchronous Systems
A protocol that implements a perfect failure detector in completely synchronous distributed systems is depicted in Figure 1 . A completely synchronous system is a distributed system in which the maximum communication and processing delays are known and the only failures permitted are crash failures. For simplicity, in this section we assume that crashed computers do not recover, i.e., they stay crashed forever. In such systems there exists an a priori known time constant In completely synchronous systems this protocol suspects all crashed computers and it does not suspect non-crashed computers. Therefore, this protocol implements a perfect failure detector in completely synchronous systems. More precisely, in purely asynchronous systems one can show that it is impossible to implement a perfect failure detector. Purely asynchronous systems are characterized by having no finite upper bound on the transmission delay of messages nor having a finite upper bound on the processing delays. Also, these systems do not have access to a clock that permits them to measure real-time.
B. Asynchronous Systems
Any perfect failure detector is complete and accurate. A complete failure detector will eventually detect all crashed computers and an accurate failure detector will at no point suspect a computer that is not (yet) crashed. To explain that one cannot implement a perfect failure detector in a purely asynchronous system, let us assume there exists such a failure detector . This is a contradiction to our assumption that 3 5 ( is perfect. This shows informally that one cannot implement a perfect failure detector in a purely asynchronous system. Before we show how to circumvent this impossibility result in timed asynchronous systems, we first explain why perfect failure detection is of practical relevance.
III. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS
To explain why perfect failure detectors are useful in the design of fault-tolerant distributed applications, we first sketch a practical problem that can be solved with a perfect failure detector but not with a failure detector that only "simulates" the behavior of a perfect failure detector. We conclude this section by sketching two more application domains of perfect failure detectors.
A. I/O Fencing
Consider that computers ¤ and share a disk via an external bus, e.g., both computers can access the disk via a shared SCSI bus [1] . As long as ¤ might access the disk in parallel which could lead to inconsistent data. Note that the communication with the disk is not message based. Typically, the access to the disk is via memory mapped I/O, e.g., a computer can communicate with the disk by writing and reading some memory mapped registers of the SCSI controller.
The above described problem of preventing a wrongly suspected computer from accessing a shared hardware device is known as I/O fencing and is addressed by modern distributed file systems like the Global File System [16] . There exists several solutions that address this problem. We classify these as follows:
P
Reservation Based: The shared hardware device provides functionality that permits computer to prevent access by the other computer. Some SCSI devices and Fibre Channel switches support this functionality [16] . P SONITH based: A SONITH (Shoot The Other Node In The Head) approach requires a network power switch (e.g., a X10 based switch) and before a computer accesses the shared disk, it communicates with the power switch to shut off the suspected computer ¤ . Our proposed perfect failure detector is similar to that of the SONITH based solutions in that a wrongly suspected computer is crashed to guarantee consistency. Note that SONITH based approaches need reliable communication to the network power switch to be able to shut off the suspected computer.
We will show that our protocol does not need reliable communication to enforce perfect failure detection since it is a lease based approach. This can make our system much more robust than for example X10 based systems are that are known for their low reliability due to the noise on the power lines, interference, and missing feedback from the X10 switches (1-way switches). Also, sometimes communication is only possible through the suspected device, e.g., if this device routes messages (see [10] for details). Moreover, we show in Sections VI and IX that our protocol does not always need special hardware, i.e., does not always need a hardware watchdog.
B. Simulated Perfect Failure Detectors
A simulated perfect failure detector is not sufficient to solve the I/O fencing problem. Simulating a perfect failure detector means that internal observers (i.e., all computers except ¤ ) cannot detect when a computer ¤ is wrongly suspected [19] . Intuitively, a non-crashed computer ¤ will eventually learn that it is wrongly suspected and will therefore crash itself to make sure that other processes cannot detect that the failure detector made a mistake. However, it is not guaranteed that Most group membership protocols provide guarantees similar to a simulated perfect failure detector since suspected processes are excluded from the membership and these processes will eventually learn that they are suspected. However, the guarantees provided by a simulated perfect failure detector is not sufficient to solve the above described I/O fencing problem.
Consider 
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. A simulated perfect failure detector is often not sufficient if the system contains external observers (like the disk) or hidden communication channels. The latter is related to the problem of tracking causality in systems with hidden communication channels as discussed in [7] .
C. Other Application Domains
Perfect failure detectors can be used to solve the I/O fencing problem. In addition to synchronizing the access to shared physical resources, they can also be used in synchronizing the access to shared logical resources. We sketch below how one can use a perfect failure detector in the implementation of an IP address take over mechanism. In this example, an IP address is a shared logical resource. The perfect failure detector is used to enforce mutual exclusion such that at most one computer is using the IP address at a time. The last application domain that we describe is on-demand rejuvenation of computers. This domain is specific to our protocol in the sense that the protocol enforces perfect failure detection by rejuvenating unresponsive computers.
IP Address Take Over
An IP address take-over mechanism enforces that a computer takes over the IP address of a computer ¤ after ¤ has failed. Such a mechanism facilitates the construction of simple but practical fault-tolerant systems. For example, this can be used to make cluster systems more fault-tolerant. Clusters often have one "head-end" computer, say, [1] . To do this, we use the feature that the software can change the Ethernet address of network interface cards.
On Demand Rejuvenation
As [15] points out, the state of computers typically ages and rejuvenating the state of a computer periodically (e.g., by rebooting it) can actually increase the availability of the computer. Instead of performing periodic reboots, one can use the protocol proposed in this paper to perform an on-demand rejuvenation. Failures of a computer are detected and failures due to state aging are automatically "repaired" by rebooting the computer. Such a system (but with a different protocol) is described in [10] .
IV. SPECIFICATION OF

¢ ¡
Originally, perfect failure detectors [5] were defined to augment purely asynchronous systems [12] . The model of [5] does not consider crash recovery. In the systems we are interested in, computers do typically recover after a crash. To solve this problem, one could of course assign each computer a new identity after it recovers. Often, this might be an acceptable solution. We show in Section V that our failure detector satisfies the specification of [5] .
However, in practice one sometimes would like to keep the identities of computers constant. This permits clients to cache the identities of computers without the need for a protocol that keeps the cache consistent. For example, some computers cache the IP addresses of the local DNS servers. These servers are identified by their IP addresses and they keep these IP addresses constant even after they reboot. To address computer recoveries without changing the identity of recovering computers, we define a new class of failure detectors.
Often, system designers are interested in specifying an upper bound on the maximum detection delay of a crash failure. This might be needed to maximize the system availability, or to enforce maximum response times that are imposed by the system requirements. To satisfy this need, our specification includes also an upper bound on the detection delay instead of requiring that crashes are detected eventually.
We define a new timed-perfect failure detector class
The failure detectors in
£ ¡
detect crash failures and recoveries within a known maximum time. The definition of the timed-perfect failure detector class is quite different from the original definition of the perfect failure detector class [5] . Nevertheless, in systems in which computers cannot recover from a crash, each failure detector in ¢ ¡ satisfies all properties of a perfect failure detector (see Section V).
Consider a system consisting of at least three computers 
, i.e., the system has just started.
Note that we replaced the traditional strong completeness property ("eventually each crashed computer is permanently suspected") by two accuracy properties: Up Accuracy and Recovering Accuracy. These two accuracy properties state that a computer 
V. PERFECT FAILURE DETECTORS
The definition of the timed-perfect failure detector class is quite different from the original definition of the perfect failure detector class [5] . We show that timed-perfect failure de-tectors are still perfect with respect to the original definition: if no computer recovers from a crash, a timed-perfect failure detector satisfies the original properties of a perfect failure detector.
A. Definition of
¡
The class of perfect failure detectors ¡ was originally specified by two properties [5] : Strong Completeness and Strong Accuracy. In the notation used in this paper, one can specify these properties as follows. Let ( be a failure detector in ¡ , let CRASHED be the set of all computers that ever crash, and UP the set of all computers that never crash. In timed asynchronous distributed systems [8] (short: timed systems) there exists no upper bound on the transmission delay of messages nor on the execution times of protocols. Also, computers can become transiently or permanently partitioned. Each computer has a local (unsynchronized) hardware clock. A hardware clock allows the measurement of time intervals with a known maximum error. In this paper we extend the timed model by hardware watchdogs that permit a nonresponsive computer to be reset as soon as the value of the hardware clock reaches a certain value. In timed systems with hardware watchdogs there is exactly one timeliness guarantee: a computer can be crashed by a given time. Hardware clocks and watchdogs are available as off-the-shelf boards but also as software modules. For example, the Linux kernel 2.4.x includes several watchdog drivers that include a software watchdog and drivers for several hardware watchdog boards.
More precisely, a timed system consists of a finite set of computers. 
Hardware Watchdogs
In this paper, we extend the timed model by a hardware watchdog. Conceptually, the interface of a hardware watchdog consists of a single register that contains a threshold value. A hardware watchdog resets its host computer if the hardware clock reaches the given threshold. Unless this threshold is periodically increased, the computer will crash.
We 
VII. PROTOCOL
We propose a protocol PTP that implements a timedperfect failure detector in timed asynchronous systems with hardware watchdogs. The proposed protocol is symmetric, i.e., all protocol participants execute the same protocol code. There are three protocol participants: Protocol PTP is designed for applications where a computer has to detect the crashes of only a very small number of computers. If a computer has to be able to detect the crash of more than computers, can execute multiple instances of this protocol: each instance has its own "software watchdog" and a computer is crashed by the hardware watchdog as soon as a software watchdog expires. While we are only interested in systems with a small numbers of computers, we discuss in Section VIII-D how the protocol can be extended for a larger number of computers.
A. Overview
The protocol is lease [13] This is the intuition of the protocol. The protocol is a little more complicated because it has to deal with clock drifts and skews, and late and dropped messages.
B. Protocol Scenarios
Before we explain the details of the protocol, we describe some important aspects of the protocol using two scenarios: lease extensions and distributed snapshot. The protocol PTP defines (besides others) two constants ) p ,
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, a variable nextRound and arrays 6
and output (see Figure 4) .
Lease Extensions
The 
C. Fail-Aware Datagram Service
Protocol PTP uses a fail-aware datagram service [9] to determine the transmission delay of messages. This service uses the hardware clock: it does not need synchronized clocks. . In contrast to the protocol described in [9] , the fail-aware datagram used in this paper retransmits the last message to a process periodically until it either (1) receives an acknowledgment, or (2) ticks have passed. In this way, the protocol can mask a bounded number of omission failures without the need of unbounded memory space. This is very similar to the notion of 1-stubborn channels of [14] . The main difference is that our protocol can stop retransmitting unacknowledged messages after a bounded amount of time (because messages with a transmission delay S will be rejected by the receiver).
D. Details
The pseudo-code of the protocol PTP is shown in Figure 4 . A receiver of a message gets the sender (' ), the send-time stamp (' The maximum calculated upper bound for a timely message.
The protocol uses leases [13] to detect crash failures. It defines several constants related to leases (lines 4,5). These constants will be defined in terms of the timed model constants. (1) ) p (lease term): The length of a lease extension that is granted by one computer (granter) to another computer (grantee). With respect to the grantee's hardware clock, the lease extension is exactly s p Proof: All times in this proof are given with respect to the É This is actually only needed if the computer has granted a lease to another computer that has not expired before the computer crashed. 
is a non-trivial timed-perfect failure detector. Hardware watchdogs make it possible to crash a computer within a bounded time. Hence, one could implement a trivial timed-perfect failure detector that crashes a computer as soon as it starts. This implementation would not update the watchdog and the watchdog would make sure that the computer crashes exactly ticks after starting. p 4 ( is a non-trivial timed-perfect failure detector. It crashes a computer only if more than one failure has occurred (e.g., a performance failure and a crash failure). As long as each of the three computers is connected to at least one other computer, no computer is forced to crash. If computer 
¤
. If one of the three computers crashes, the other two computers can stay up as long as they remain connected.
VIII. MEASUREMENTS
We implemented the protocol in C++. This implementation runs on Linux, Sun, and IRIX. The measurements were done with "defused" watchdogs that were not able to crash a computer. However, we also ran the protocol for more than 1.5 million seconds with a (non-defused) hardware watchdog without experiencing any forced crashes.
In Linux we use a (slightly modified) device /dev/watchdog to implement a fully functional watchdog. This device uses either a hardware board or software emulation. The fail-aware datagram service sends messages as UDP packets. It automatically retransmits the last messages (stores one message per type and process) for up to time units to mask message omission failures.
A. Time Constants
We ran the protocol on three of our main center computers: (A) a SGI Challenge which has 4 CPUs and 512 MB of memory. This machine contains home directories and is for general use, (B) a SUN Enterprise 3000 which has 2 CPUs and 256 MB of memory. This machine contains home directories and hours. The figure shows the variations of scheduling delays over time. In particular, it shows the experienced peak scheduling delays. Note that extended scheduling delays can prevent a computer from renewing its leases. This measurement used the standard roundrobin scheduler. Of course, when deploying this protocol one would want to use a real-time scheduler. Figure 6 shows the round-trip delays experienced by protocol PTP running on computer . If (1) is a reasonable value for unsynchronized and uncalibrated hardware clocks [8] . Hence, one can derive the maximum detection delay as follows:
If there is no specification of the maximum detection delay of crashes in the specification of the application, one can derive ) p from the measured round-trip times and scheduling delays. Selecting the above values, a computer is rebooted if it is unresponsive for
. There are a few caveats when using such a short timeout. For example, some computers "freeze" when a hard-mounted NFS server goes down. This protocol makes sure that a frozen computer is rebooted after approximately ! s p . On one hand, one can try to make sure that this protocol is not affected by NFS freezes. On the other hand, one can select a larger ) p such that a computer is reset if it is frozen for "too long".
However, all protocol parameters can be derived from the application specification if the latter states a maximum detection times for computer crashes. For example, consider that the specification states that the crash of a computer has to be detected within 
. In summary, all protocol parameters can be derived from the application and the hardware clock specification.
B. Detection Times
To measure the detection times of crashes and recoveries, we ran the protocol on three processes on the same computer. In this way, we simplified the measurement of the detection times. During this measurement, we set Equation 1 ). The time it takes for the protocol to detect that a computer recovers is very short (see Figure 7) . This is essentially the time it takes for the recovering process to send its first message to each of the other two participants.
The crash detection times are substantially longer than the recovery detection times (see Figure 7) . The reason for this is that a computer This optimization does not change the worst case detection time. The additional distributed snapshot is not guaranteed to succeed. For example, the messages of this distributed snapshot might suffer omission failures. Hence, the worst case detection time is determined by the original protocol PTP.
D. Extensions
The protocol PTP was designed for systems with three computers. This was motivated by the application domains sketched in Section III. For systems with more computers, one can run multiple instances of this protocol as sketched above. Alternatively, one can modify the protocol in the following ways.
Majority Partition Variant
Instead of needing a lease from only one other computer, a computer needs a lease from a majority of the computers to update its watchdog. This majority can include the computer itself, i.e., in a system with three computers a computer needs a lease from one other computer as in protocol PTP. This extension ensures that as long as a computer ¤ can communicate in a timely fashion with a majority of computers, ¤ can keep updating its watchdog. The advantage of this extension over PTP is that it can tolerate more crash failures.
To detect the crash failure of a computer ¤ , the failure detector has to detect that ¤ does not have leases from a majority of the computers. The detection if the leases of a computer have expired becomes more difficult. For systems with more than 3 computers, the snapshot algorithm has to have two nonoverlapping phases. Only if there exists a majority of computers such that their leases granted to a computer ¤ have expired by the end of the first phase and they are still expired at the start of the second phase, computers can suspect ¤ .
Primary Partition Variant
Protocol PTP (" f y
) and also the above sketched variant needs ! " n computers to mask " crash failures. This limitation could be overcome by using a primary partition approach similar to that pioneered by ISIS [2] . This can solve the problem with only ÿ Ã ¡ E " m n Ä computers for
" v S c
(as long as a majority of the currently not suspected processes survives sufficiently long). The main difference is that a process would need a lease from a majority of the computers that are currently not suspected to be permitted to extend its watchdog. The potential disadvantages of the primary partition approach is that (1) the protocol is more complicated, and (2) that recovery after a complete system failure can in certain instances not be performed in a bounded time even if a majority of the computers are up. The latter is the case, if the members of the last primary partition do not recover after a complete system failure.
IX. PERFECT PROCESS FAILURE DETECTOR AND PROCESS WATCHDOGS
Our protocol PTP needs a hardware watchdog to make sure that a suspected computer is crashed before it is suspected. A hardware watchdog kills all processes running on the computer. In some applications it is sufficient to kill one process in a timely fashion instead of crashing the whole computer. To implement a perfect process failure detector, we can use protocol PTP to detecting crashes of the processes participating in the protocol. However, we replace the hardware watchdog by a "process watchdog". A process watchdog £ ¢ kills the process ¥ no later than specified by the watchdog register. The remainder of this section we explain that some systems permit to implement such a process watchdog in software (in user space).
In most systems one cannot guarantee that a process can execute a task by a given deadline. For example, we measured in [11] the scheduling delays of processes experienced on highly loaded Linux 2.2.14, 450MHz Pentium II system. The maximum measured scheduling delay (i.e., the time by which a task was supposed to be awakened and the time it was actually awakened) was in this measurement é ! c 2 h 8 (see Figure 9 ). Since increasing the load further will increase the scheduling delay further, we cannot assume that we can perform a process to perform critical actions by a given time.
In order to implement a software watchdog we do not have to guarantee that a process performs certain actions by a certain time. Instead we have to make sure that a process To verify that one can kill a process by a certain time, we implemented a process watchdog using the Unix interval timer mechanism. We then measured the time between a process executing its last instruction and the time the watchdog is supposed to kill the process (its deadline). Even on a heavily loaded system we were not able to find executions in which a process executed an instruction after its deadline (see Figure  9) .
The measurement can be explained as follows. User processes are periodically preempted by the operating system using a timer interrupt. This preemption will happen at least every, say, c 2 h 8
(time quantum). Often it will happen earlier due to interrupts but never later since the processing of the timer interrupt can only be delayed by another interrupt which will also preempt the process. Before the operating system resumes a process after a preemption, it checks for pending signals for the process. In particular, interval timer signals will be processed before the process is resumed. By setting the interval to at least one time quantum before the deadline, one can make sure that the process does not perform any instruction after its deadline -at least in most "reasonable" operating systems. 
X. RELATED WORK
Failure detectors have received quite some research interest since Chandra, Hadzilacos and Toeug published their seminal paper about the weakest failure detector for solving consensus [3] . Failure detectors were originally defined [4] to augment purely asynchronous systems [12] such that consensus becomes solvable.
Perfect failure detectors are neither implementable in purely asynchronous systems nor in partially synchronous systems [18] . If it were possible to implement then in purely asynchronous systems, one could solve consensus [5] -which is impossible to do in purely asynchronous systems [12] . Perfect failure detection is also impossible to solve in timed asynchronous systems [8] . We circumvent this impossibility by using hardware watchdogs -which are not part of the model defined in [8] -and which permit a timely crashing of computers.
Most related to this work is the paper of Sabel and Marzullo about simulating fail-stop in asynchronous distributed systems [19] . Sabel and Marzullo show how one can simulate a perfect failure detector in a purely asynchronous system. The main idea is to relax the accuracy property by using the happens-before relation: if suspects ¤ , then this "suspects ¤ event" must not happen before [17] any local event of ¤ : ¤ might execute events after it is suspected but none of these events are "caused" by the "suspects The main difference between this work and [19] or the work in virtual synchrony [2] is that this work makes sure that a computer is crashed before it is suspected. The protocol of [19] hides the fact that a computer might actually be suspected before it crashes -as long as computers only communicate via some "controlled" message passing mechanism. This is sufficient for applications in which all computers participate in the protocol and there are no hidden channels. If there are hidden channels, e.g., a shared disk, it might become observable that the failure detection is not perfect. In particular, this might lead to inconsistencies and arbitrary failures. The protocol of [19] cannot be used to solve the I/O fencing problem (see Section III).
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we addressed the problem of how one can implement a perfect failure detector. The difficulty is to make sure that no computer suspects a non-crashed computer ¤ -even at times when the other computers cannot communicate with ¤ . The main idea is that a computer ¤ commits suicide before any other computer is permitted to suspect ¤ . However, a computer is only permitted to commit suicide if more than one failure has occurred. The proposed protocol achieves this using leases and local hardware watchdogs.
If an application specifies worst (or, average case) detection delays, we showed how the parameters of the proposed protocol can be derived from these delays. The approach described in this paper is currently used in several other projects. One project uses the failure detector protocol to rejuvenate computers to fix transient failures and to detect permanent failures in case the rejuvenation does not fix the problem. Another project uses the perfect failure detector to take over the IP and Ethernet address of a failed computer.
